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legal treatment for food has had a long history. Products
S PECIAL
liability began with food and, for the most part, food has remained
in the vanguard of legal developments ever since. Recent events have
raised doubts, however, whether this preeminence will long continue.
It was recently noted that most of the interesting developments in
products liability in 1960 occurred outside the field of food and even
outside those of drugs and cosmetics. Condori, Product Liability Cases1960, 16 FooD DRUG Cosm. L. J. 132 (1961). Moreover, it seems likely
that the most significant future developments will continue to occur
outside.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is based on an address delivered at the Practising Law Institute,
New York, on July 11, 1961.
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EROSION OF THE PRIVITY
REQUIREMENT

This focus of immediate interest
away from food is illustrated in the
disappearing requirement of privity. For food, all that remains is
the mopping up. Few defense lawyers still entertain the hope that it
may yet be possible to retain this
defense. Of the committed states,
a majority now appear to have dispensed with the requirement in
food cases. Of the uncommitted
states, it seems obvious that most
will ultimately line up with this
majority. The only real doubts lie
with Sales Act states that have already committed themselves to the
privity requirement. Some of these
may wait for legislation.
In this last group of states, which
until recently included New York,
the basis for doubt has been twofold. First is stare decisis. Second
is the apparently uncongenial language of the Uniform Sales Act,
which may have been intended to
limit implied warranties to those
between buyer and seller in the
same transaction. (See especially
the introductory clause and clause
(1) of section 15.) Both factors present obstacles to any conscientious
court that would otherwise like to
do away with the necessity of privity. As recently as May 1960, when I
took a reading on the developments
during the 1950's, I concluded that
unless the slow trend toward abolishing the privity requirement ac-
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celerated sharply, the requirement
would be around for a long time.
No sooner was that conclusion expressed in print [Dickerson, Recent
Developments in Food Products
Liability: Privity, 8 DEFENSE L. J.
105 (1960)], than such an acceleration made itself obvious!
It is true that Virginia had joined
the ranks of the nonprivity states,
at least as against the manufacturer,
in 1959 in Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201
Va. 213, 110 S.E. 2d 203, and that
Arizona, undeterred by the Uniform Sales Act, had done so two
years earlier in Crystal Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz.
163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1957). There
had also been rumblings in Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and Utah.
Express Warranty
Also, there had been activity in
the field of express warranty.
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d
612 (1958), which found in the
manufacturer's advertisements and
labels an express warranty as to the
quality of a home permanent preparation, created quite a stir in the
law review notes and articles. It reminded us of its famous predecessor, Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932), the
Washington case in which liability
for injuries from a shattered windshield was based on express representations that appeared in advertising pamphlets distributed by the
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manufacturer. But little has come of
the Toni case, at least so far as food
is concerned. Only a small percentage of the food sold moves under a
representation of fact solid enough
to support an express warranty.
Future inroads on the privity doctrine are likely to come from other
directions. This may be true even
for nonfood products.
There are several recent food
cases that suggest this conclusion
may be wrong, although they represent only the occasional exception. In Lane v. C. A. Swanson &
Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.
2d 723 (Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist.
1955), the plaintiff had been injured by a bone in a canned product labeled "Boned Chicken" that
had been widely advertised as containing "no bones." The California
Court of Appeals held that these
descriptions constituted an express
warranty that there were no bones
whatsoever in the product, despite
the defendant's strong argument
that the description "no bones"
merely meant that the product was
intended to be a boneless product,
without any assurance of perfection.
This case appears to be unique
in the food field, although it is
possib!e to find in Bryer v. Rath
Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.
2d 442 (1959), decided by the Maryland Supreme Court, aspects that
are something like it. Here, the
t-ouble had been caused by a chicken bone in a product likewise
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marketed as "Boned Chicken." Although the court decided in favor
of the plaintiff, its rationale is not
entirely clear. On the one hand, it
says that this written assurance required the manufacturer "to exercise as much care as would enable
users to rely with reasonable safety
on the assurance," leaving the impression that it is up to the manufacturer not to disappoint the consumer's increased expectations. On
the other, it says, "This is not to
say that the packer was an insurer.
.. " Apparently, the court is saying
that an express representation of
this kind increases the manufacturer's standard of care to an undefined degree, without holding him
to strict liability. If so, the Lane
case still stands alone.
A more solid basis for attacking
the privity requirement is not so
much that modern advertising appeals create express warranties as
that they make clear that the sales
by which the manufacturer disposes of his goods are aimed at the
ultimate user, despite the intervention of a number of middlemen.
This had been the supporting
rationale in an Ohio home permanent case that preceded the Toni
case. Markovich v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265,
149 N.E. 2d 181 (1958), did away
with the privity requirement on
grounds of public policy, even
though the advertising appeals had
failed to create an express warranty.
However, even in the aggregate,
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these developments were hardly
enough to get excited about.
The Henningsen Case
The big explosion occurred in
May, 1960. The now-famous New
Jersey case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960), threw
out the privity requirement lock,
stock, and barrel. It held an automobile manufacturer liable in implied warranty for the injury to
two persons caused by defective
steering equipment, despite the
lack of privity.
There are several reasons for considering this a highly important case.
First, the decision was by the highest court of the State. Second, it did
away with the privity requirement
without benefit of express warranty. Third, it did away with the
privity requirement in a field far
removed from food, drugs, and cosmetics. Fourth, it did away with
the privity requirement despite the
troublesome language of the Uniform Sales Act. Finally, it did away
with the privity requirement in the
face of earlier judicial commitments by the same court. In these
collective respects, the case stood
almost alone. Its greatest significance lies in the encouragement
that it will probably give to courts
that would like to do away with
the privity requirement but have
until now been too cautious to
change the status quo.
The Henningsen case rests most
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convincingly on grounds of public
policy, namely, that in the Davidand-Goliath relationship between
consumer and manufacturer any
notion that the two are remote
from each other is denied by the
nature of modern advertising appeals, in the light of which the
intervention of one or more distributors creates little more than a
trivial technicality. Under such an
approach, it can be argued either
that the privity requirement ought
to be abolished or, assuming that
it must be retained, that a direct
privity relationship actually exists.
The significance of the Henningsen case is not to be minimized by
pointing out technical deficiencies
in the court's reasoning: its citation
of easily distinguishable, reversed,
or overruled authorities (cited in
161 A. 2d at 83); its failure to explain how it found in the sale by
the dealer a sale "by description"
with its attendant warranty of
merchantability; its failure to reconcile its conclusions with the
rather formidable language of section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act;
and its pretense that the earlier
drug and cosmetic cases doing
away with the privity requirement
had represented a significant breakthrough from the narrow category
of food. However vulnerable the
opinion may be on these grounds,
it is a fact of legal life that will undoubtedly have widespread and farreaching influence, a fortiori in the
food cases.
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especially interesting because the
damage incurred affected only
Nor is its lustre dimmed by the property.
fact that there were a few earlier
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hamcases outside the field of food, mond, 269 F. 2d 501 (10th Cir.
drugs, and cosmetics (only one of 1959), struck down the privity rewhich was relied on in the Hen- quirement in an automobile tire
ningsen case) that seemed to throw case, but, being only a federal
out the privity requirement. A court's prediction of what the
Michigan case, Spence v. Three Missouri and Kansas Supreme
Rivers Builders and Masonry Sup- Courts will ultimately do about
ply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. privity in the area outside food,
2d 873 (1958), while striking hard drugs, and cosmetics, it, too, fails
at the privity requirement, did so to carry full conviction. The same
with respect to a warranty of due is true of Hinton v. Republic Aviacare, which made the cause of ac- tion Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.
tion in question little more than a N.Y. 1959), in which a federal diseuphemism for a negligence ac- trict court, charged with applying
tion, with respect to which the California law to a death case
privity requirement has long been brought against an airplane manudead.
facturer, held that the absence of
More significant is jarnot v. Ford privity was no bar even though the
Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 defective product was an airplane
A. 2d 568 (1959). Here, despite the instead of food. Its implied prediclack of privity, the manufacturer tion of future California thinking
of a truck was held liable for prop- received partial support in Gottserty damage caused by a defective danker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182
king pin. This case loses force by Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
being the opinion of a lower court (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1960).
However, no downgrading of
and being grounded only on an unexplained doctrine called the "prin- these cases can deny that they are
ciple of advertised-product-liabil- additional straws in a wind that is
ity." This reference leaves the blowing with increasing intensity
reader wondering whether the against the privity requirement,
court is merely enforcing an ex- even outside the special fields of
press warranty based on an adver- food, drugs, and cosmetics. A simitisement under the old Baxter prin- lar straw is the fact that courts are
ciple or knocking down the privity finding additional reasons for holdrequirement, with the general ad- ing that privity, even if required,
vertising appeal serving only as a actually exists. In Peterson v. Lamb
supporting rationale. The case is Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.
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2d 575 (1960), a California court
held that the manufacturer of a
grinding wheel was in privity with
an injured employee of the purchaser, because his use of the wheel
must have been contemplated by
the manufacturer. The same principle was applied in Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr.
Cal. App. 2d -,
823, 828 (Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1961), in which a restaurant employee had been injured by an exploding soft drink bottle.
Although the Henningsen case
went unmentioned in a recent decision retaining Delaware's privity
requirement, Ciociola v. Delaware
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Del.
-, 172 A. 2d 252 (1961) (broken
bottle), it appears to have played an
important role in the overthrow of
Connecticut's privity requirement
in a detergent case, Hamon v.
Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A. 2d
294, 296 (1961), and in the repudiation of the privity requirement in a
Hawaiian case involving a flammable hula skirt, Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 101 (D.
Hawaii, 1961). It was relied on in
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 263 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.
2d 918, 921 (1961), clarifying Michigan's position on negligence and
privity in warranty suits, and the
latter, in turn, was relied on in
Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
-Neb. -,
112 N.W. 2d 252,
256 (1961), repudiating the privity
requirement in Nebraska, at least
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with respect to food, if nothing else.
The prime example of the trend
stimulated by the Henningsen case
has been the recent about-face executed by New York's Court of Appeals in Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9
N.Y. 2d 195, 173 N.E. 2d 773
(1961), which involved a defective
can of salmon. Here, privity was
lacking between the buyer's teenage daughter and the defendant
retailer. The lower court said that
as a legal principle the privity doctrine lacked the "transcendent dimension" of reality, and threw it
out. 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S. 2d
407, 408 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The Appellate Division, on the other hand,
found the privity requirement very
much alive in New York, presumably on the ground adopted by the
dissent in the lower court, that New
York's Sales Act, which governed
the transaction, had been construed
to require privity. Id. at 414. That
was four years ago.
On March 2, 1961, the Court of
Appeals reversed New York's well
established position and held that,
"the infant's cause of action should
not have been dismissed solely on
the ground that the food was purchased not by the child but by the
child's father." Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y. 2d 195, 173 N.E. 2d
773, 776 (1961). The court was
moved by the already voluminous
literature proclaiming the unfairness of the privity rule and by the
fact that upwards of 20 states had
already done away with it. On this
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it cited the Wells and Henningsen
cases. As for the Uniform Sales
Act, the court said that the Act
says nothing about privity and that
the rule requiring privity is only a
judicial rule. "Alteration of the law
in such matters has been the business of the New York courts for
many years. . . ." Id. at 775.
We should probably give the
Court of Appeals credit for mentioning the Uniform Sales Act, and
recognizing it as a possible obstacle.
This was more than the Arizona
Court did in the Cathey case and
the New Jersey Court in the Henningsen case. Beyond that, the
court's handling of the problem
posed by the Uniform Sales Act is
not particularly impressive. Although the Uniform Sales Act may
not use the word "privity," it uses
language that strongly suggests
that the Act contemplates only warranties arising between the buyer
and the seller in the same transaction. By this I do not mean to
imply that the Act necessarily requires privity. I only suggest that
it takes a bit of legal doing to avoid
that result. Dickerson, Recent Developments in Food Products Liability: Privity, 8 DEFENsE L. J. 105,
132-34 (1960).
The Greenberg case leaves the
status of much of the privity rule
in doubt in New York. On the
ground that "we should be cautious
and take one step at a time," the
court limited its holding to suits
against the retailer by a member
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of the purchaser's household. It
also limited it to food, plus the category of "household goods." It will
be interesting to learn what this
category comprehends and whether
the court will confine itself to it.
Why the court draws the line
around household goods is not immediately apparent.
Whatever their merits as exercises in judicial craftsmanship, the
joint effect of the Henningsen and
Greenberg cases will undoubtedly
be considerable, except possibly in
Sales Act states in which the courts
have been more fastidious in dealing with the language of statutes.
Until the recent enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, New
Hampshire furnished such an example. Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 98, 25 A.
2d 125, 127 (1942).
The Uniform Commercial Code
At the same time, with the increasing adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which has been
enacted in more than a dozen
states, questions as to the meaning
of the Uniform Sales Act are becoming academic. The Code is
significant on two counts. First,
section 2-318 expressly removes the
privity requirement in suits against
retailers brought by guests or
members of the buyer's household.
Second, although it attempts to remain scrupulously neutral so far as
the manufacturer and other sellers
are concerned, thus passing the
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buck squarely to the courts, it is
more liberal than the Uniform
Sales Act, because it includes no
restrictive language comparable to
15.
that of section
In at least one state, the privity
requirement has been abolished by
statute, even as against the manufacturer. Several years ago, the
Georgia legislature enacted a statute that in effect creates in each
sale of new goods by a manufacturer a warranty of merchantability free of privity limitations but
subject to being defeated by an
express or implied disclaimer. GA.
CODE ANN. §96-307 (1958). It is not
confined to food.
The Restatement of Torts, Second
The latest attack on the citadel
of privity comes from still another
source. This takes the form of the
proposed section 402A, which Dean
William L. Prosser and fellow authors of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961),
submitted in May, 1961 for consideration by The American Law
Institute:
"§402A. Special Liability of Sellers of Food
"One engaged in the business of
selling food for human consumption who sells such food in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is subject
to liability for bodily harm thereby
caused to one who consumes it,
even though
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"(a) The seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and
sale of the food, and
"(b) The consumer has not
bought the food from or entered
into any contractual relation with
the seller."
It is plain that, within the area
of its coverage, the proposed section would do away with the privity requirement at all levels of
manufacturing and distribution.
The section not only is interesting
to food lawyers but has caused
consternation among those concerned with the manufacture of socalled ethical drugs. Why? A
comment to the proposed section
explains that the term "food" includes all products intended for
internal human consumption, including drugs that are to be taken
internally.
If section 402A were limited to
food in its more conventional sense,
it would have much to support it.
There is strong historical precedent
for treating food differently. Also,
strong support for the substance
of it can be found in the existing
cases. On the other hand, when
the category is broadened to include ingested drugs, it becomes
harder to support the proposed
section as a "restatement" of the
law and to find policy reasons to
support a section that goes so far,
and no farther.
The essential undesirability of
the stopping place proposed by the
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official comments was so apparent
that The American Law Institute,
at the same meeting at which the
section was proposed, voted to extend the principle expressed by it
to cover all products for intimate
bodily use. While this makes more
consistent sense from a policy
standpoint, it makes it correspondingly harder to call the proposed
section a "restatement" of current
law.
Whatever difficulties there may
be in rationalizing the proposed
section 402A, even as amended, I
am not going into extended mourning over the death of the privity
requirement. It has been accomplishing very little good and may
have been creating a good deal of
harm. Although it is not the purpose here to debate the merits of
the privity requirement, I want to
make the point that the lawyers'
preoccupation with its mysteries
has distracted attention from the
more important issues of products
liability that confront us today. For
a discussion of the merits of the
privity requirements, see Dickerson,
The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J.
585 (1961), 17 Bus. LAW. 157 (Nov.
1961).
DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

In the protracted debates over
the privity requirement, it is easy
to forget that to do away with the
privity requirement is merely to
get rid of a barrier. Suppose we
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remove the barrier. What remains?
It takes more than the elimination
of a defense to win a law suit. The
plaintiff has to show that he has a
right against the defendant and that
it has been infringed. What kind
of right exists against the manufacturer, with whom the plaintiff has
had no dealings? Did the manufacturer make a promise to the
plaintiff that he has broken? Did
he make a representation that was
untrue?
The courts get into doctrinal
difficulties if they try to construct
direct consumer rights out of the
scraps of actual promise and representation that may or may not
have been expressed or implied by
the manufacturer to his immediate
purchaser; that is, if they try to
apply the usual warranties of fitness
and merchantability spelled out in
sections 15(1) and (2) of the Uniform Sales Act. Comment, 25
WASH. U.L.Q. 293 (1940). Sooner
or later they must realize that the
law cannot build adequate legal
doctrine to protect the consumer
unless it erects an obligation directly to the consumer, bases it on
public policy, and molds it around
the armature of the plain facts of
today's merchandising patterns.
This is what the Georgia statute, in
effect, does. It is essentially the approach of the proposed section 402A of the RESTATEMENT.
If a direct responsibility to the
consumer is the only kind that
makes sense, the central problem
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becomes one of determining what
this direct responsibility should
consist of. On the one hand, it
seems to be widely assumed that,
if the courts or legislatures do away
with the privity requirement, a
manufacturer will automatically
have to indemnify every person
who is injured by one of his products. This is what Burton Weitzenfeld has recently called "liability
without warranty," a liability generally comparable to that under
workmen's compensation, where all
the claimant has to show is the
causal relationship involved in an
injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment. I have
called it "strict strict liability."
Limitations-"Deective" and
"Unreasonably Dangerous"
Simple strict liability, on the
other hand, need not consist of an
obligation by the manufacturer to
compensate the injured consumer
under any and all circumstances.
The point is clearer if we examine

the language of proposed RESTATEMENT section 402A. This does not
say that the seller must pay the
consumer some money if his food
product injured the consumer. The
food must be, first, "defective" and,
second, "unreasonably dangerous."
Not everything that causes injury
or illness is either "defective" or
"unreasonably dangerous." In other
words, strict liability need not be
so strict that the only issue is one
of causation, as it tends to be under
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workmen's compensation. Some of
those who seem to panic at the
threat of strict liability may not
fully appreciate this.
At the 1961 meeting of The
American Law Institute an opinion
was expressed that the provision
just referred to was redundant and
that the word "defective" could be
stricken, since the most reliable test
of defectiveness is whether the
product is "unreasonably dangerous" to the consumer. The objection was overruled, and the word
"defective" retained on the ground
that it was needed to nail down the
kind of case in which the product
was improperly made and to excuse the manufacturer of a highly
dangerous article that was properly
made. Apparently, it was feared
that without the word "defective"
a highly dangerous product might
be considered to be ipso facto "unreasonably dangerous." I would
have thought otherwise, because all
the ingredients of liability could
probably be subsumed under the
word "unreasonably." If this section stands, I wonder what kind
of situation could exist in which
the product was "unreasonably
dangerous" without being legally
"defective."
In any event, it is important to
formulate appropriate concepts of
what is "defective" and what is
"unreasonably dangerous." How
these concepts are developed will
determine the ultimate impact of
doing away with the privity re-
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quirement and imposing strict liability. The appropriate development
of these concepts may, indeed, take
some of the sting out of strict liability. It can also furnish the key to
such difficult legal problems as those
involved in trichinosis, allergy, disclaimers, and warnings. While the
most provocative questions. appear
to be arising outside the field of
food, much needs yet to be done to
clarify the law with respect to food.
In a suit for negligence, the
plaintiff's main problem beyond
that of showing causation is to
stigmatize the actions or omissions
of the defendant. Under strict liability, on the other hand, the problem of stigmatizing the defendant
is removed. Even so, the plaintiff
must stigmatize the product as "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous." In the usual food case, this is
a simple matter. A mouse is
enough to stigmatize a bottle of
soft drink. Staphylococcus is enough
to stigmatize a custard-filled eclair.
Both are legally "defective." Both
are "unreasonably dangerous." Unfortunately, the simple and typical
instances do not give us a ready
key to a concept of "defectiveness"
on which products liability generally should be based. Let us consider several specific problems.
"Natural" - "Foreign" Test of
Defectiveness
In the field of food, we find the
courts still fighting the battle of
the chicken pie. Does a chicken
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bone in a chicken dish make the
dish legally defective? Some courts,
such as those in California, use the
test of "naturalness." If the offending article is accessory to one of the
purported ingredients, the object is
"natural" to the product and, no
matter how badly an unsuspecting
consumer is hurt, he cannot recover.
For me, this test has little rational
foundation. Its only justification
seems to be the rough correlation
existing between what is natural to
the product and what consumers
normally anticipate and guard
against. Unfortunately, it reaches
an absurd result in a case like Maiss
v. Hatch, 8 Cal. Rptr. 351 (App.
Dep't., Super Ct. 1960), in which
the plaintiff broke his tooth on a
bone in a hamburger served by the
defendant caterer. As a consumer
I can testify that, while an occasional piece of gristle in a restaurant
hamburger does not surprise me,
I would never be on my guard
against a bone capable of breaking
a tooth. I even wonder whether
under the California approach
anything could be "foreign" to a
hamburger!
I wonder, too, how it would be
if the concept of "natural to the
product" were imported into other
product areas. Suppose that in making an automobile or a lawnmower
the manufacturer used a metal
whose characteristics were inherently inadequate to do its job.
Could this be brushed aside as

28
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something "natural" to the product? Certainly not. In fact,- the
whole thrust of the concept goes
counter to the concept of the "inherently dangerous," which has
been so important in the nonfood
negligence cases.
"Reasonable Expectations"
Test of Defectiveness
The more sensible test, adopted
by many courts, including the Supreme Court of Ohio in Allen v.
Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.
2d 167 (1960), and the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Betehia v.
Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,
103 N.W. 2d 64 (1960), is the
"reasonable expectations" test: Is
the offending condition one that
consumers normally expect and
guard against? It is clear that consumers anticipate and guard against
bones in some kinds of fish. It
seems equally clear that they do
not anticipate and guard against
bones in hamburger. At least one
lower New York court has come
to the same conclusion as to a piece
of bone in salami. Lore v. De
Simone Bros., 12 Mis. 2d 174, 172
N.Y.S. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958). As
for oyster shells in oysters, the Ohio
court in the Grafton case agreed on
the legal test to be applied, but divided on the factual question of
what consumers normally expect
of a serving of fried oysters. Despite these perplexities, a philosophy
of consumer protection based on
the reasonable expectations of the

parties usually helps to supply a
sensible answer.
What about trichinae in pork
chops? Trichinosis has often confused the courts, because the mere
presense of trichinae in uncooked
pork seems to constitute an obvious
"defect." DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

AND

THE
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190-211 (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass. 1951). The fact that the
consumer cannot safely eat it in
that condition has led some courts
to hold that trichinous pork is
legally defective per se, even
though they have felt constrained
to ban the plaintiff on the ground
that in failing to cook it properly
he was contributorily negligent. To
me, it makes more direct sense to
decide the matter on the basis of
reasonable expectations. Because a
sensible concept of legal defectiveness should take into account what
buyer and seller normally expect
the consumer to do with the product before he eats it, the real legal
issue would seem to be this: Do
normal cooking precautions include cooking pork to the thermal
death point of trichinae? Under
this approach trichinous pork is not
necessarily legally defective.
If this analysis is correct, we cannot evaluate a product merely by
looking at it or by measuring the
harm that it can potentially do to
a consumer. We must appraise it
also in the context of what people
usually expect in the kind of situation presented. For this purpose, let
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us consider a situation in which,
in the expectations of the parties,
the identical product is legally defective under some circumstances
but not legally defective under
others. Suppose a processor of
salami fails to cook it sufficiently
to kill the trichinae in it. Suppose
he sells it in that condition to a
retailer, who resells it to a consumer, who becomes infected. Assuming no privity requirement, the
processor is strictly accountable to
the consumer. The product as sold
by the processor was obviously defective, because salami is supposed
to be edible without further processing by the consumer.
Let us suppose, again, the same
manufacturer, the same retailer, the
same consumer, the same salami,
and the same case of trichinosis.
Could additional circumstances exist by virtue of which the identical
product as sold by the processor
would not be legally defective?
The precise circumstances arose
in Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah
2d 35, 327 P. 2d 822 (1958). Here
the Utah Supreme Court absolved
a packer of partly processed but
trichinous salami because the retailer to whom he sold it had reassured him that it would be properly cooked by the retailer before
sale to the public. This result
seems defensible on the ground
that the product that injured the
consumer (legally defective salami)
was not in legal contemplation the
same product as that sold by the
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defendant packer to the retailer
(legally acceptable raw materials
for salami), even though the physical object that injured the consumer
was the identical object that the
defendant processor had sold to the
retailer. We can look at it another
way: Although the defendant manufactured the partly processed raw
materials, it was the retailer who
for these purposes assumed the role
of "manufacturer" of the fully
processed salami, a responsibility
that he failed to discharge.
It is possible, on the other hand,
to disagree with the Suhrmann case
on the ground that the court should
have considered the unfinished
salami as legally defective, even in
the hands of the packer, because
the agreement unreasonably jeopardized the consumer. However,
unless the packer had reason to believe that the retailer was unreliable, the decision of the Utah court
seems sound.
This sort of thing might occur
also in other circumstances. Suppose the defendant processor sells
a truckload of unwholesome butter
to a buyer only because the buyer
assures him that he plans to use it
for an industrial, nonfood purpose.
Would the processor be liable to
an injured consumer if the buyer
violated this understanding and
turned the product back into regular food channels? It seems likely
that he would not, because although the plaintiff has been injured by something clearly inade-
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quate as "food," the product is not
to be characterized as such in the
hands of this producer, because the
two parties were properly treating
it as something else. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the
potential risk to the consumer requires that the processor be held
responsible in such a case unless
he takes the precaution of removing or marking the containers to
prevent the contents from being
diverted back into food channels.
In either event, these cases show
that the reasonable expectations of
participants other than the consumer must also be considered.
The problem of defining a legal
defect arises also for allergies, which
in view of the absence of court cases
is not likely to become the problem for food that it has been for
cosmetics and wearing apparel.
Here, again, the courts are beginning to find satisfactory answers in
the reasonable expectations of the
parties. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

AND

THE

FOOD

CONSUMER

211-30 (1951). With the increasing
use of new additives, the problem
may someday become significant
even for food.
Use Qualification
It should be apparent that the
concept of defectiveness depends
on the concept of what the offending product is. This, in turn, includes the concepts of contemplated use and contemplated
performance. What may be legally
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adequate for one purpose may be
legally defective for another. Because most food has only one use,
the point is less obvious there.
Consequently, even within the
framework of strict liability, the
manufacturer may have a legitimate escape hatch in the concept
of contemplated or normal use.
Clearly, the restaurant keeper is not
liable if the customer stuffs mashed
potatoes in his ear and gets an ear
ache. If this seems implausible, let
me mention examples from areas
outside that of food.
In Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155
F. 2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946), the defendant manufacturer of wire rope
got off the legal hook, even without the help of the privity requirement, because the plaintiff's use of
the rope in question, which was to
support a scaffold, was one abnormal to that kind of rope. Much
the same result could be reached
under notions of "proximate causation," which limits liability to
classes of foreseeable harm. There
is also the doctrine of "avoidable
consequences." On the contemplated or normal uses of a hula
skirt, see Chapman v. Brown, 198
F. Supp. 78, 89 (D. Hawaii, 1961).
State of Knowledge Qualification
A big issue in the nonfood cases
today is whether a product is to be
considered as legally defective, even
under strict liability, when it produces serious harm at a time when
even scientists are inadequately
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aware of its potentialities. For aircraft, the Electras provide a recent
example. Some precedent exists for
saying that a product is not legally
defective until at least scientists
know its dangers. Thus, in the
allergy cases, courts that permit
recovery make it a condition of liability that the product have an ingredient that is known to be
capable of inflicting harm on a significant, generally determinable percentage of the public.
While this approach has had
some judicial acceptance, fears have
been expressed that a similar approach to new products not yet
known by scientists to be unreasonably dangerous would, by giving
manufacturers one free shot at the
public, make them guinea pigs for
products that should have been
more adequately tested before being
marketed. On the other hand, even
Dean Prosser, Reporter for the
RESTATEMENT, has expressed sympathy with the objective of protecting the still ignorant manufacturer
of a new drug product. That such
notions might be accommodated
within the concepts of "defective"
and "unreasonably
dangerous"
should comfort those who have
been thinking that all will be lost
if the current assault on the citadel
of privity is ultimately successful,
as it most probably will be.
Other Aspects of "Reasonable
Expectations"
Other problems

that can

be
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clarified by an adequate philosophy
of consumer protection based on
the reasonable expectations of the
parties include those of disclaimer
and secondhand goods, neither of
which is likely to become significant in the field of food.
The drug cases present problems
that are hard to solve even with
the help of a sophisticated philosophy of consumer protection. Part
of the problem lies in the fact that
for many new drugs no clear concept of "normal use" has yet
emerged. Chemical X may be good
for curing flea bites, fair for curing
eczema, and poor for curing seborrhea. What expectations have sufficiently crystallized to serve as a
criterion here? At any rate, strict
liability does not necessarily require
us to rely on hindsight. Nor, on
the other hand, does it commit us
to giving the drug manufacturers
one free shot at the consumer.
Another complication arises for
prescription drugs, where we must
consider not only the reasonable
expectations of the patient but
those of the prescribing doctor.
Should the patient be protected to
the extent of the reasonable expectations of the doctor? That the contemplated use presupposed by any
concept of defectiveness may depend, in the case of a particular
drug product, on the issuance of an
appropriate prescription is illustrated by Kaspirowitz v. Schering
Corp., N.J. Super. -,
175 A.
2d 658 (1961), in which the plain-
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tiff, whose dermatitis was traceable
to a shampoo that he had obtain:d
without a prescription, had no legal
basis for claiming that it was "defective."
Although such cases do not relate
directly to food, they help to illume
the general concept of defectiveness
and thus provide potential guidance
in situations involving special-use
problems, such as the disadvantageous consumption of salted peanuts
by a person on a salt-free diet! See
Judge Goodrich's concurring remarks in Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 Fed. 2d
292, 302 (3rd Cir. 1961) (allegedly
carcinogenic cigarettes).
From this analysis, it should be
clear that exposing the manufacturer to strict liability does not necessarily mean that he must under
all circumstances underwrite the
consumer's well-being in relation
to the product. Strict liability is not
so strict as might first appear.
NEGLIGENCE

If space permitted, we might also
consider several of the devices that
courts have been using to avoid the
injustices of the privity requirement. This might include a discussion of negligence, as bolstered by
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
or of negligence per se based on
the breach of a pure food statute.
It is interesting to find, for instance,
that negligence per se was recently
successfully based, apparently for
the first time, on a breach of the
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federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, instead of a state pure food
law. This was done in Orthopedic
Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.
2d 455 (4th Cir., 1960), involving a
defective surgical nail. So far as I
know, the case is unique. I have
not dwelled on these things because the general erosion of the
privity requirement is making
them of little significance. On the
other hand, the federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act will be
significant in determining whether
the particular product is legally
defective.
My general impression from
reading the reports is that the
courts have rarely been able to try
a bona fide negligence issue in a
food products liability suit, because
the specific facts surrounding the
defect are rarely known to either
party. In practice, if the plaintiff
can persuade the jury that the defect was in the product when it left
the defendant the inferences are
usually drawn in his favor on the
theoretical issue of negligence, with
or without an assist from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or that of
negligence per se. Because this is
only paying lip service to culpability, what we have in effect been
getting is strict liability. If so, the
privity requirement has served only
to drive underground the strict
liability that is now emerging.
With the death of the privity
requirement, the fictions and euphemisms of "negligence" will no
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longer be needed, and they will
probably soon disappear. (Even
the concept of express warranty
will become largely superfluous in
the consumer cases.) Strangely
enough, this will affect the trial of
products liability suits very little,
beyond eliminating some of the
formal legal arguments that lawyers now make. The central factual
issue in a products liability suit
will continue to be what it has been
all along: Assuming the food that
injured the plaintiff was legally
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous," can the condition be traced
to the defendant's factory?
CAUSATION;

BURDEN

OF PROOF

If I read the recent food cases
correctly, the critical problem of
causation is, and has been, how to
assign the respective burdens of
proof between the plaintiff and the
defendant on matters on which
specific facts are available to neither
side. We cannot solve this complicated problem simply by uttering
the legal platitudes that the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff, and that
he is entitled to rely on the normal
inferences of fact. Not only is the
whole question of the defendant's
fault shrouded in a factual mystery,
but even much of the causation issue is obscured from direct view.
For this reason the plaintiff can rely
only on general or fragile inferferences and suppositions such as
those supported by res ipsa loquitur.
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First, he must prove that his hurt
was caused by a condition in a particular food product. Next, he must
prove that the particular product
was manufactured by the defendant. Third, he must prove that the
defect was in the product when it
left the defendant's plant. We
might think, off-hand, that in the
food cases this last would be the
easiest of all to prove. And so it is
in many cases. But not always.
This third phase of proving
causation is dramatized in the
tampering cases, in which there are
several points of view. The hardest
on the plaintiff is that taken by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
which seems to have borrowed it
from earlier cases in Tennessee. In
Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v
Byrne, 258 S.W. 2d 475, 476 (Ky.
App. 1953), the court said that
"Human experience has forced us
to the conclusion that the presence
of foreign objects in bottled drinks
may in the ordinary course of
things be the result of a prank or
a deliberate wrongful act equally
well as being the result of negligence on the part of the bottler."
The court refused, therefore, to
find any presumption in the plaintiff's behalf or to apply res ipsa
loquitur. That case and several
more recent ones have held that the
plaintiff must prove actual negligence if he cannot affirmatively
disprove tampering in a situation
providing the opportunity to tamper. These were cases in which the
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retailer allowed customers to wait
on themselves or permitted them
access to the place where the bottles
were stored. Naturally, a plaintiff
cannot sustain such a burden. Testimony by the retailer that he noticed
no tampering, and would have
done so if there had been any, was
not enough. Several Illinois cases
seem to have taken the same approach. E.g., Heimsoth v. Falstafi
Brewing Co., 1 111. App. 2d 28, 116
N.E. 2d 193 (1953).
Recent cases in Mississippi and
Texas indicate, on the other hand,
that in those states the burden of
proof on the tampering point is
squarely on the defendant, for reasons that to me seem persuasive.
This is the prevailing point of
view elsewhere. In Wichita CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288
S.W. 2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956), the Court of Civil Appeals
in Texas found the Kentucky
court's discovery of a tendency to
tamper in the Byrne case to be unrealistic. Its opinion echoes that
of the dissent in the Byrne case,
which stated, "I am not convinced
that the placing of foreign objects
in bottled soft drinks, by pranksters or evildoers, is a matter of
such common occurrence as to justify the conclusion that the possibility of that must be disproved before
the presumption of negligence of
the bottler may be applied." 258
S.W. 2d 475, 476 (Ky. App. 1953).
The glaring weakness in the
minority view, which puts the bur-
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den on the plaintiff, is that it
frames the plaintiff's burden in
terms of negating the opportunity
to tamper, and then assumes that
from an opportunity to tamper it
is reasonable to infer actual tampering. This weakness is pointed
up forcefully in Keller v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 214 Ore. 654, 330
P. 2d 346 (1958), where the Oregon Supreme Court said, ". . . in
this case, as well as in every other
one we have examined, there has
been no evidence that tampering by
competitors or busybodies was an
actual probability. The only indication is the contention that the
opportunity or possibility existed.
This is not to establish a probability ..
" In other words, the plaintiff should not lose merely because
he fails to negate the improbable.
Establishing the probability of tampering would, under elementary
principles of proof, seem to fall
more logically on the defendant. A
more recent case to the same effect
is Asher v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
Neb. -, 112 N.W. 2d 252,
255 (1961).
Tampering does not seem to be
a live issue for food products not
involving the removable crown
cap, and outside a few states like
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois,
it does not seem to pose a serious
problem for the plaintiff even for
products that do involve such a cap.
What about the nonfood cases?
Frankly, I do not know, but my
guess is that it would depend upon
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the product, the nature of the defect, and the reasonable probability
(not opportunity) of an intervening cause under the circumstances.
An examination of GILLAM, PRODUCTs

LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE

INDUSTRY (University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis, 1960), suggests
that for products such as automobiles the possibility of an intervening cause may be strong for a
mechanical failure occurring a significant time after the car was purchased.
Fears are now being expressed
that the pendulum may be swinging too far in favor of the consumer with respect to the difficulties of proving causation. Condon
suggests that the Henningsen case
was far too lenient in this respect.
Condon, Restatement or Reformation?, 16 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
473 (1961). He points out that the
plaintiff's "expert" witness, after
admitting that the car was too
badly damaged to tell specifically
what went wrong, was able to say
only that, based on the plaintiff's
version of the accident, something
went "wrong from the steering
wheel down to the front wheel."
The court said this was enough to
raise a question of fact for the jury.
Condon strongly disagrees. Furthermore, he feels that it reflects a
growing attitude.
While Condon may be right
about the Henningsen case, the
opposite criticism could be made
of Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling
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Co., 11 Utah 2d 30, 354 P. 2d 580
(1960). Here the plaintiff was nonsuited because the offending bottle
was allowed to stand for five weeks
in an easily accessible, unlocked
room. Because the plaintiff was unable to allege specific facts tending
to negate the possibility that the
bottle had been tampered with, he
could not even get to the jury.
The dissent found it much more
plausible to assume that the defect
got in at the factory. This is precisely the kind of situation in which
the court should not need expert
testimony or special evidence to
establish the normal probabilities.
Juries are admirably fitted to determine issues such as these. The
notion of some prankster sneaking
into the plaintiff's storeroom, surrepticiously inserting a paper clip,
and carefully resealing the bottle
does not commend itself as a reasonable probability. Cases like this
tend to be unique and should be
allowed to go to the jury.
The issue of burden of proof was
also squarely raised by Reine v.
Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 126 So. 2d 635 (La. App.
1961), in which the plaintiff recovered for illness caused by a
roach egg and a toy jack in two
respective bottles of Coca Cola. The
court resolved it by approving the
lower court's opinion holding that
the plaintiff did not have to offer
"negative proof that the foreign
substance in the beverage did not
result from the mishandling by
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those other than the manufacturer."

cap (not the bottle) and that a
bottler's franchise within an area
ant controls the channels of dis- is usually exclusive? See also Baker
tribution he assumes the risk of v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of
177 N.E.
tampering by outsiders. This is il- Gary, ___ Ind. App. -,
lustrated by a recent California 2d 759, 764-770 (1961) (defective
case, Paul v. Rodgers Bottling Co., soft drink bottle), and Crowell v.
183 Cal. App. 2d 680, 6 Cal. Rptr. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., Mass.
867 (3d Dist., 1960), involving a -,
173 N.E. 2d 609, 610 (1961)
mouse in a soft drink bottle that (unwholesome frankfurts).
the plaintiff had bought from a
On the other hand, in Gonzales
vending machine operated by the v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Colo.
defendant bottler.
, 363 P. 2d 667, 669 (1961) (bug
Other recent cases also support in canned peas); Jackson Coca-Cola
the notion that tracing a known Bottling Co. v. Nails,- Miss. -,
defect to the defendant remains the 130 So. 2d 258, 259 (1961) (wire
central issue in most food products and dirt in soft drink); and Campliability cases. In Tiffin v. Great bell Soup Co. v. Dusek, -Miss.
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 111. 2d 48, -,
135 So. 2d 414 (1961) (metal
162 N. E. 2d 406 (1959), the plain- in canned soup), evidence that the
tiff lost because the circumstances offending foreign object came from
suggested that it was more likely a product prepared by the defendthat the offending ham had be- ant entitled the plaintiff to take the
come contaminated with hemolytic case to the jury on the central quesstaphylococci by being allowed to tion of causation.
stand unrefrigerated in his home
CONCLUSION
than by being exposed to contamination in the defendant's establishThe factual problem in these
ment, where, the evidence showed, cases is to balance the reasonable
all normal precautions had been probabilities. The legal problem is
taken. In Elledge v. Pepsi Cola to fix the burden of proof with
Bottling Co. of Winston-Salem, 252 respect to kinds of factual issues
N.C. 337, 113 S.E. 2d 435 (1960),
on which evidence is unavailable
the plaintiff lost because he failed and in which the burden of proof
to prove that the Pepsi Cola dealer is, therefore, decisive. It is here,
from whom the retailer had bought and in the concept of legal "defecthe bottle of Suncrest was the de- tiveness," that the most important
fendant. Is it possible that the battles of strict liability will probplaintiff's attorney overlooked the ably be fought.
fact that it is sometimes possible
As for the privity requirement,
to identify the bottler by the crown requiescatin pace.

So far, of course, as the defend-

